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Continuous Variable Solution for Byzantine Agreement
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We demonstrate that the Byzantine Agreement Problem (BAP) in its weaker version with de-
tectable broadcast, can be solved using continuous variables Gaussian states with Gaussian oper-
ations. The protocol uses genuine tripartite symmetric entanglement, but differs from protocols
proposed for qutrits or qubits. Contrary to the quantum key distribution (QKD) which is possi-
ble with all Gaussian states, for the BAP entanglement is needed, but not all tripartite entangled
symmetric states can be used to solve the problem.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Ud, 03.67.-a
An algorithm is commonly defined as a set of rules for
solving a problem in a finite number of steps. One of the
aims of Quantum Information is to provide new protocols
and algorithms which exploit quantum resources to find
solutions to problems which either lack a solution using
classical resources, or the solution is extremely hard to
implement. The term “Byzantine Agreement Problem”
was originally coined by L. Lamport in the context of
computer science. In a cryptographic context it refers to
distributed protocols in which some of the participants
might have malicious intentions and could try to sabo-
tage the protocol inducing the honest parties to take con-
tradictory actions between them. This problem is often
reformulated in terms of a Byzantine army, where there
is a lieutenant general who sends the order of attack-
ing or retreating to each one of his lieutenants. Those
can also communicate pairwise to reach a common de-
cision concerning attacking or retreating, knowing that
there might be traitors among them including the gen-
eral. A traitor could create fake messages to try that
different parts of the army attack while others retreat
putting the army at a great disadvantage. The ques-
tion is thus whether there exists a protocol among all
the officials involved that, after its termination, satisfies
the following conditions: The lieutenant general sends
an order to his N − 1 lieutenants such that: (i) All loyal
lieutenants obey the same order, (ii) If the lieutenant
general is loyal, then every loyal lieutenant obeys the or-
der he sends. Lamport, Shostak and Pease proved in [1]
that if the participants only share pairwise secure clas-
sical channels, then Byzantine Agreement or broadcast
(BA) is only possible iff t < n/3, where n is the number
of players and t the number of traitors among them. In
[2], Fitzi and coworkers introduced the important con-
cept of detectable broadcast, and found a solution using
quantum resources (see also [3]). Detectable broadcast is
said to be achieved if the protocol satisfies the following
conditions: (i) If no player is corrupted, then the pro-
tocol achieves broadcast, and (ii) If one or more players
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are corrupted, then either the protocol achieves Byzan-
tine Agreement or all honest players abort the protocol.
Thus, in a detectable broadcast protocol, cheaters can
force the protocol to abort, i.e. no action is taken, but in
such cases all honest players agree on aborting the pro-
tocol so contradictory actions between them are avoided.
Here we investigate the possibility of solving detectable
broadcast using Gaussian states and performing only
Gaussian operations. Quantum Information with Gaus-
sian states has become recently a very active research
area [5] since (i) Gaussian states (e.g. photons in co-
herent, squezeed or thermal states) are often the main
quantum resource available in current experiments, (ii)
in spite of the fact that they are elements of a Hilbert
space of infinite dimensions they have a very compact
and easy mathematical representation and (iii) it is de-
sirable to classify entangled Gaussian states according
its performance to several quantum information tasks as
well as exploiting the differences between discrete and
continuous variables scenario.
The protocols using entanglement as a resource[2, 6, 7]
are based on 3 differentiated steps: (i) distribution &
test of the quantum states, (ii) measurements of the
distributed states to establish a primitive and (iii)
broadcast protocol. The (iii) step is fundamentally
classical, since it uses the outputs of the measures of
the quantum states to simulate a particular random
generator (primitive). In the simplest case, in which only
3 parties are involved, traditionally denoted by S, the
sender, and the receivers R0 and R1, and at most, only
one is a traitor, the desired primitive generates for every
invocation, with uniform distribution, a random permu-
tation on the elements {0, 1, 2}, i.e. (xS , xR0 , xR1) ∈
{(0, 1, 2), (0, 2, 1), (1, 0, 2), (1, 2, 0), (2, 0, 1), (2, 1, 0)} so
that each player i has an assigned output xi. In this
primitive, each player ignores how the other two values
are assigned to the other players. Furthermore, nobody
else (besides the parties) have access to the sequences.
Quantum entangled states are used in the protocol
to distribute classical private random variables with
an specific correlation between the players, in such a
way that any malicious manipulation of the data can
be detected by all honest parties allowing them to
2abort the protocol. In the discrete case such primitive
can be implemented with e.g. Aharonov states |A〉 =
1√
6
(|0, 1, 2〉+|1, 2, 0〉+|2, 0, 1〉−|0, 2, 1〉−|1, 0, 2〉−|2, 1, 0〉)
which assures the distribution and test part to be se-
cure [2]. Exploiting the fact that whenever the three
qutrits are all measured in the same basis then all three
results are different, the players are left -after discarding
all the states used for the testing part- with a sequence
of j = 1, 2...L outputs schematically represented by
the table below. We denote this quantum primitive as
Q-flip.
j 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 . . .
S 2 0 0 1 2 1 0 2 1 . . .
R0 1 1 2 0 1 0 1 0 2 . . .
R1 0 2 1 2 0 2 2 1 0 . . .
After accomplishing the distribution & test part of the
protocol, the sender S will broadcast a bit x ∈ {0, 1}
(0
∧
=“attack”, 1
∧
=“retreat”) to the two receivers us-
ing classical secure channels. Following [2] broadcasting
(step iii) proceeds as follows:
(iii.1): We denote by xi the bits received by Ri (no-
tice that if the sender is malicious, the broadcasts bits
xi could be different). Each receiver Ri demands to S
to send him the indices j for which S got the result xi.
Each player Ri receives a set of indices Ji.
(iii.2): Each Ri test consistency of his own data, i.e.
checks weather his output on the set of indices he re-
ceives (Ji) are all of them different from xi. If so the
data is consistent and he settles his flag to yi = xi. oth-
erwise his flag is settled to yi =⊥.
(iii-3): R0 and R1 send their flags to each other. If both
flags agree, the protocol terminates with all honest par-
ticipants agreeing on x.
(iii-4): If yi =⊥, then player Ri knows that S is dishon-
est, the other player is honest and accepts his flag.
(iii-5): If both R0 and R1 claim to have consistent data
but y0 6= y1, player R1 demands from R0 to send him all
the indices k ∈ J0 for which R0 has the results 1−y0. R1
checks now that (i) all indices k from R0 are not in J1
and (ii) the output R1 obtains from indices k correspond
to the value 2. If this is the case, R1 concludes that R0 is
honest and changes his flag to y0. If not, R1 knows that
R0 is dishonest and he keeps his flag to y1. Detectable
broadcast is in this way achieved.
Let us now introduce, analogous to the Q-flip, a bit-value
primitive denoted by W-Flip. W-Flip is a random gen-
erator that (for every invocation), with uniform distri-
bution, generates a random permutation on the elements
{1, 0, 0}, i.e. (xS , xR0 , xR1) ∈ {(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1)}
so that each player i has an assigned opt xi. Invoking
twice a W-Flip permits to map bit values to the trit
values of the Q-flip {0, 1, 2} according to the following
rule:(1, 0) → 0, (0, 1) →1, (0, 0) → 2 plus an additional
element “Z” (1, 1)→ z.
j Q-Flip Z-Flip
S 0 0 1 1 2 2 z 2 2
R0 1 2 0 2 0 1 2 z 2
R1 2 1 2 0 1 0 2 2 z
To implement the Q-Flip with Gaussian variables via the
W-Flip primitive we choose a family of fully inseparable
3-mode Gaussian states, completely symmetric under ex-
change of the players, characterized by a single parameter
a with covariance matrix [8]:
γ(a) =


a 0 c 0 c 0
0 b 0 −c 0 −c
c 0 a 0 c 0
0 −c 0 b 0 −c
c 0 c 0 a 0
0 −c 0 −c 0 b


(1)
where b = 14 (5a −
√
9a2 − 8) and c = 14 (a −
√
9a2 − 8).
For a > 1 all NPT-criteria[8] are satisfied, so the state
has genuine 3 partite entanglement. Now to transform
quantum states into a sequence of correlated private clas-
sical trits between the 3 players, each player measures
the quadratures of the electromagnetic field, e.g. posi-
tion (momentum)[9]. Denoting by Xˆi the corresponding
operators, and by xˆi the measurement results, the play-
ers communicate classically with each other and agree
on only those values for which |xˆS | = |xˆR0 | = |xˆR1 | = x0
with x0 > 0. Every player i maps xˆi = +x0 to the log-
ical bit xi = 1 and xˆi = −x0 to the logical bit xi = 0.
Notice that W-flip requires that the probabilities of the
outputs fulfill: (i) p(100) = p(010) = p(001) = p and
δ = p(else) ≪ p, (ii) p˜ → 13 and δ˜(else) → 0 where
p˜(xSxR0xR1) = p(xSxR0xR1)/(
∑
p(xSxR0xR1 ))) are the
conditional probabilities. Using for the representation of
the Gaussian states their Wigner function:
W (ξ) =
1
pin
√
det γ
exp
[−(ξ − d)Tγ−1(ξ − d)], (2)
where d is a 2n real vector and γ the covariance matrix
probabilities are straightforwardly calculated:
p(xSxR0xR1) = Tr
(
ρ
xSxR0xR1
M ρa
)
= (2pi)n
∫
W
xSxR0xR1
M (ξ)Wa(ξ)d
2nξ.(3)
Here ρ
xSxR0xR1
M = ρ
xS
S ⊗ ρ
xR0
R0
⊗ ρxR1R1 describes the disen-
tangled 3 Gaussian modes obtained after each party has
performed a measurement in its subsystem and ρa is the
initial 3 partite entangled state described by γ(a) and d.
Optimal results are achieved for a displacement vector
3dTW = −x03 (1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0), and yield:
δ1 = p(000) = C(a, σ) exp
(
−4
3
x20
K1
)
, (4)
δ2 = p(111) = C(a, σ) exp
(
−16
3
x20
K1
)
,
δ3 = p(110) = p(101) = p(011) = C(a, σ) ×
exp
(
−4x20
(
σ2 + 14
[
5a−√9a2 − 8])
K1K2
)
p = p(100) = p(010) = p(001) = C(a, σ) exp
(
−8
3
x20
K2
)
with coefficients K1 = σ
2 + 12
[
3a−√9a2 − 8], K2 =
σ2 + 14
[
3a+
√
9a2 − 8], and the prefactor reads:
C (a, σ) =
[
det
(
γM + γ(a)
2
)]− 1
2
(5)
=
8
(a− c+ σ2) (b+ c+ 1
σ2
)√
(a+ 2c+ σ2)
(
b − 2c+ 1
σ2
)
In the approximation a≫ 1 it follows that:
p˜ =
1
3
− 4
9
k +O(k2); δ˜i → 0 (6)
with k = exp
[− 43 (x0σ )2]. The probabilities depend
from the parameters a, x0 and σ, but there exists a
large region in the parameter space for which p˜ = 13
and δ˜i → 0. However, this condition is violated for
a ≤ amin = 5
√
2
6 indicating that not all pure 3-mode
symmetric entangled Gaussian states can be used to im-
plement the W-Flip. Finally, we remark here that imple-
menting the Q-Flip primitive by selecting those values
for which |xA| , |xB | , |xC | ∈ {0, x0} so that each player
will associate the logical trit to the results of their mea-
surement according to the following rule qm = 2, 1, 0 if
xm = +x0, 0,−x0 is not possible. In such case, the ab-
solute and conditional probabilities never fulfill the re-
quirements of the Q-Flip primitive.
We move now to the distribution & test part of the
protocol which represents the first step in the execution
of the W-Flip and has only two possible outputs: global
success or global failure. In the case of failure a player
assumes that something went wrong during the execution
of the protocol and, therefore, he aborts any further ac-
tion. The players share pairwise secure classical channels
and secure (noiseless) quantum channels. The basic in-
gredient to implement a secure distribution & test part,
is based in the possibility that each player can check cor-
relations by asking the other participants to send to him
different random subsets of their systems. In doing so, it
is possible to detect manipulation of the data on an sta-
tistical basis and to abort the protocol if necessary. Here
we focus on demonstrating security and ignore efficiency
questions[10]. This part proceeds as follows:
(i.1) R1 prepares a large number m = 1, 2, . . . ,M of sys-
tems in state γ(a) with dW and sends one subsystem to
S and another to R0.
(i.2) R1 chooses (randomly) two disjoint sets of indices
Ki, i ∈ {S,R0} (KS ∩KR0 = ∅) and send Ki to player i.
Player i is asked to send his subsystemsm ∈ Ki to player
j. For each m ∈ Ki, participant j measures the two
subsystems in his possession while R1 measures his sub-
system. After communication on their results over secure
classical channels they agree on those indices K˜j ⊆ Kj for
which |xj | = |xR1 | = x0. R1 and j check now whether the
correlations of the W-Flip occur: p˜100 = p˜010 = p˜001 =
1
3 ,
p˜else = 0. If the test was successful, i.e. if the measure-
ment results were consistent with the assumption that
the states have been distributed correctly, the players
i ∈ {j, R1} set the flag fi = 1, otherwise fi = 0. In an
analogous way, the test is performed for S and R0.
(i.3) Players S, R0 and R1 send their flags to each other.
Every player who receives a flag “0”, sets his flag also
to “0”. Every player with flag “0” aborts the protocol.
Otherwise the execution of the protocol proceeds. This
step terminates the distribution & test part.
In the second phase of the protocol a selection of the
distributed systems is chosen to establish the bit se-
quences which will be use to implement the W-Flip prim-
itive. In this phase, again honest parties may abort the
protocol if malicious manipulations occurs.
(ii-1) The players S, R0 and R1 agree upon a set of sys-
temsm ∈ M˜ ⊂M , which have not been discarded during
the distribution & test part.
(ii-2) Player S chooses (randomly) two disjoint sets of
subsystems labeled by indices LiS ⊂ M˜ and after sending
index set LiS to player i demands player i to send his
subsystems m ∈ LiS to him. In each case, the (random)
choice LiS is secret to party j, i.e. player R1 has no in-
formation about the set LR0S . Analogously this step is
performed for R0 and R1.
(ii-3) S performs now measurements on subsystems m ∈
M˜− [LR0S +LR1S ] = MˆS. The analogous step is performed
by the other players i.
(ii-4): After measuring their whole sequences, player i ∈
{S,R0, R1} now announces publicly, for which m ∈ Mˆi
he measured ±x0, represented by an index set Mˆmi . The
order in which the players announce their measurement
results can be specified initially and based e.g. on a ro-
tation principle.
(ii-5) Without loss of generality let us specify this pro-
tocol step for player S. From the following sets LR0S ∩
MˆmR1 =: U
R1
S and L
R1
S ∩ MˆmR0 =: UR0S let U˜RiS ⊆ URiS
for i ∈ {0, 1} be the index set for which the player
S measured ±x0 twice. Analogously to the first phase
of the protocol, player S can test if the output of his
measures agree with the correlations of a proper W-Flip
(p(00) = p(10) = p(01) = 1/3 and p(11) = 0) If the test
is successful, the player sets his flag fS = 1, otherwise
fS = 0. Same procedure is analogously performed by R0
and R1. From this step on, players deal exclusively with
4the outputs of their measures,i.e. classical instruments.
(ii-6) S checks correlation on his outputs in the following
set Mˆ := MˆmS ∩ MˆmR0 ∩ MˆmR1 ⊆ MˆmS . If the test is suc-
cessful, S sets his flag fS = 1, otherwise fS = 0. R0 and
R1 do the equivalent step.
(ii-7): For a randomly chosen set V S ⊂ Mˆ player S de-
mands from R0 and R1 their measurement results. S
tests this control sample for the assumed W-Flip hypoth-
esis. If the test is successful, S sets his flag fS = 1,
otherwise fS = 0. R0 (R1) perform this step with a set
V R0 ⊂ Mˆ\V S (V R1 ⊂ Mˆ\(V S ∪ V R0)) respectively.
(ii-8) Every player with a flag 0 aborts the execution of
the protocol. Otherwise the players agree upon a set
W := Mˆ\(V S ∪ V R0 ∪ V R1) as the result of the W-Flip
invocation, which must contain an even number of ele-
ments 2L so that a sequence of L Q-flips can be extracted.
Broadcasting, as described previously by steps (iii) can
now be implemented.
It is straightforward to show [11], that the strategy
implemented by (iii) is secure and, if there is enough
statistics, the occurrence of the Z-flip can be safely de-
termined.
Finally, we have considered two different types of er-
rors that can occur when implementing the W-flip with
Gaussian states. The first one is just the error on ob-
taining a false combination of outputs, i.e. δi. This error
will propagate in the Q and Z-flips so that the proba-
bility of finding a combination which is not appropriate
is bounded from above from η = 1 − (3p˜)2. The sec-
ond source of “errors” are malicious manipulations. In
order to manipulate the measurement results of other
players, player i could shift the local component of the
displacement vector of the distributed state using local
transformations. Notice that a shift on x0 is equivalent
to a shift on one of the components of displacement vec-
tor. That means that both kind of manipulations re-
sult on the same change of probabilities for a given out-
put calculated by the overlap (see Eq.3). Parameterizing
the shift in the displacement vector by the parameter K,
dTW 7→ (d′)TW = −x03 (1, 0, 1, 0,K, 0)
Thus player i could determine via subsequent commu-
nication with the other players (step ii.4) with certain
probability, the occurrence of the outputs of the other
players thereby gain additional information. In con-
trast, direct measurement of a local manipulation with-
out classical communication between i and j is impossi-
ble. This can be seen by realizing that the partial trace
TrC
(
ρ(γ,d′)
)
=
∫
WAB (ξAB) = TrC
(
ρ(γ,d)
)
with
γAB =


a 0 c 0
0 b 0 −c
c 0 a 0
0 −c 0 b

 and dAB =


x1
0
x1
0

 . (7)
A possible strategy for the traitor could consist of the
following points: (i) Discrediting honest players by ma-
nipulating the displacement vector in such a way that
non consistent combinations appear, (ii) to hide success-
ful measurements to the honest players which result in
combinations that might be disadvantageous. However,
one can detect the effects of such manipulations by the
test steps proposed in (ii-5)-(ii.7)[11].
To summarize, we have proposed an algorithm to solve
detectable broadcast with continuous variables, i.e. us-
ing Gaussian states and Gaussian operations only. To
the best of our knowledge this is the first truly “multi-
partite” algorithm for continous variables. Moreover, it
can be straightfowdarly adapted to the discrete case by
using 3 partite W-states[14] which presently are already
created in ion traps[15]. Finally, we have shown that al-
though entanglement is needed to solve the problem not
all entangled symmetric states can be used for this pur-
pose and we have found a lower bound on the amount of
entanglement required[13].
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